Science, society, and the search for truth: An interview with Chrysostomos Mantzavinos#
In this interview, Professor Chrysostomos Mantzavinos MAE explores the idea of science as a self-governing enterprise and reflects on the institutional culture that underpins its success.
Professor Chrysostomos Mantzavinos
About Chrysostomos Mantzavinos#
Chrysostomos Mantzavinos is a Professor of Philosophy at the University of Athens
, known for his interdisciplinary work at the intersection of philosophy, economics, and the social sciences. He holds two PhDs (in Economics and Philosophy) from the University of Tübingen, and has held academic appointments at institutions including Freiburg, Stanford, and the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
His research focuses on how knowledge is produced, structured, and understood within scientific and social systems. He is the author of several influential books, including Individuals, Institutions, and Markets, Naturalistic Hermeneutics and Explanatory Pluralism. His most recent work, The Constitution of Science (Cambridge University Press, 2024), explores the idea that science operates like a polity governed by an unwritten constitution – an institutional framework that underpins the scientific enterprise.
Professor Mantzavinos was elected to the Philosophy, Theology and Religious Studies section of Academia Europaea in 2022, to the European Academy of Sciences in 2024 and became a member of the Académie Internationale de Philosophie des Sciences in 2023.
Read the interview#
Can you explain, in simple terms, what you mean when you describe science as having a “constitution”?
“Science is a major cultural achievement that was planned by no individual mind but emerged spontaneously as the unintended outcome of interaction between individuals engaging in epistemic activities. Science is a human endeavour, permanently unfinished, a project of humanity of astonishing range and success. The scientific enterprise is a social process unfolding within an intricate institutional framework that structures the daily activities of scientists and shapes their outcomes. Institutions are the rules of the game, the normative patterns that scientists follow. Those institutions of science which are of the highest generality make up the Constitution of Science.
There are two broad types of institutions depending on who enforces the rules. Those institutions that have emerged spontaneously in a process of social interaction that no one can consciously control are the informal institutions. Those institutions that are the product of collective political decisions and are enforced by the state are the formal institutions, i.e. the legal rules. In the specific domain of science, consequently, the informal institutions of science are made up of all normative rules that scientists follow in their daily scientific lives, mainly the scientific techniques they employ and the moral rules that they respect; the formal rules are the legal rules which differ between countries. The most important informal and formal institutions of science make up what I call the “Constitution of Science”, which defines the way the scientific game is played: other rules, other game.”
There are two broad types of institutions depending on who enforces the rules. Those institutions that have emerged spontaneously in a process of social interaction that no one can consciously control are the informal institutions. Those institutions that are the product of collective political decisions and are enforced by the state are the formal institutions, i.e. the legal rules. In the specific domain of science, consequently, the informal institutions of science are made up of all normative rules that scientists follow in their daily scientific lives, mainly the scientific techniques they employ and the moral rules that they respect; the formal rules are the legal rules which differ between countries. The most important informal and formal institutions of science make up what I call the “Constitution of Science”, which defines the way the scientific game is played: other rules, other game.”
Could you share a real-world example that shows how the constitution of science works in practice?
“It might be useful to refer to an extreme example where the formal constitutional rules have completely crowded out the informal constitutional rules of science: the example of the authoritarian political regime in the former Soviet Union. The state organs using violence or simply the threat of violence were able to influence the epistemic problem-solving activities in a dramatic way and so to determine their outcomes decisively. The so-called ‘Lysenko affair’ highlights the extent to which the informal rules of science can in fact be impaired by authoritarian regimes. Trofim Denisovich Lysenko was an agronomist who rose to prominence in the former Soviet Union in the 1930s in a situation where the authorities wanted to increase the production of wheat after years of poor harvests. Lysenko’s experimental program promised to deliver a dramatic improvement of crop yields, if only the first generation of seeds were treated, since the effects of the treatment would be inherited. His proposal ignored the genetics that had been developed by Morgan in the wake of the rediscovery of Mendel – the concept of a gene being ‘bourgeois idealism’. In other words, his proposal was at odds with classical genetics which consistently rejected the inheritance of acquired characteristics, that is, Lamarckism.
Lysenko’s ideas were endorsed by the communist party and became official Soviet policy, indeed official Soviet science, whereas prominent scientists supporting orthodox genetics were denunciated, prosecuted and imprisoned. The meeting of the Lenin Academy of Agricultural Sciences in 1948 resulted in the adoption of Michurnism, an account of epigenetic inheritance commonly known as Lysenkoism, as the “only correct theory” to be taught in the USSR. Lysenko at the end of his report on problems with Mendelian genetics stated that “the Central Committee of the Party has examined my report and approved it.”
Lysenko’s ideas were endorsed by the communist party and became official Soviet policy, indeed official Soviet science, whereas prominent scientists supporting orthodox genetics were denunciated, prosecuted and imprisoned. The meeting of the Lenin Academy of Agricultural Sciences in 1948 resulted in the adoption of Michurnism, an account of epigenetic inheritance commonly known as Lysenkoism, as the “only correct theory” to be taught in the USSR. Lysenko at the end of his report on problems with Mendelian genetics stated that “the Central Committee of the Party has examined my report and approved it.”
What inspired you to write The Constitution of Science? Was there a particular moment or experience that sparked the idea for the book?
“There was not a specific experience that sparked the idea for the book, but more of a concrete problem that I encountered in many years of doing both science and philosophy. Although science is a social enterprise and is thus of a contingent nature, it can and in fact does lead to genuine scientific progress – contrary to the claims of a great array of relativists who standardly stress its social nature, but deny its progressive character. In other words, although science is a human affair in which not only noble interests, but all kinds of interests play a motivating role and power relations inescapably exist, it remains a truth-seeking enterprise. How is this possible? My answer to this is that political orders have always been local. Legislation has been enforced by states that could control only a specific territory. The rules that comprise the scientific method are, in contrast, universal.
Ever since the Scientific Revolution science has progressed despite the existence of very different political movements such as totalitarianism, fundamentalism, colonialism and political regimes such as kingdoms, empires, dictatorships and democracies. Why? Because of the prevalence of the informal institutions of science, the rules that scientists have been following in their daily work independently of the political regime that they happened to be born in and live in. It is these informal institutions that comprise the constitutional culture of science that have led to the unique success of this distinctive human endeavour that we call “science”.
Ever since the Scientific Revolution science has progressed despite the existence of very different political movements such as totalitarianism, fundamentalism, colonialism and political regimes such as kingdoms, empires, dictatorships and democracies. Why? Because of the prevalence of the informal institutions of science, the rules that scientists have been following in their daily work independently of the political regime that they happened to be born in and live in. It is these informal institutions that comprise the constitutional culture of science that have led to the unique success of this distinctive human endeavour that we call “science”.
Why do you think it’s important for society to better understand how science works as a system, not just the discoveries it produces?
“Because only if the working properties of science are illuminated, is it possible to conduct a reasonable discourse about whether a society organised as a polity wishes to protect science or even prime it by funding scientific activities by taxes, for example. The scientific method may take very different forms, but as long as it consists in the techniques of bringing products of our theoretical imagination in contact with empirical data by scientists following the scientific conventions of their time and the moral rules necessary for this kind of epistemic problem solving, it remains a distinctive way of grasping the structure of the world. The general public very often misunderstands the nature of the scientific process. Scientists are human beings, and they make errors permanently. However, the informal rules of science which allow for the criticism of scientific findings give rise to an essentially self-correcting mechanism. This is replete with weaknesses of course, human weaknesses, but it is the only mechanism that we have discovered up to now that can yield a true account of natural and scientific facts.
The scientific discourse is a very specific kind of discourse, exactly because of its tight institutional structure. It is a serious misunderstanding of the actual scientific practice to conceptualise the situation as if a scientist alone judges the evidential merit of a hypothesis and decides to accept it or reject it. The decision is his or her decision, but not a scientific decision. It becomes a scientific one, only when it has passed through the tight institutional context of the scientific enterprise – only then warrant is certified and objective knowledge is established. A single scientist cannot be objective, only the rules of the scientific process and its outcomes are objective. To the question asked by the public: “Why is science special and why should it be protected by an organised polity?”, the answer is: because our fellow citizens who are doing science are guided by the scientific method encapsulated in the informal rules of science, the only rules so far that we can trust to lead us to a true account of reality. The scientific community establishes the intersubjective validity of its products in virtue of following an objective procedure. No procedure can be absolutely objective – a view from nowhere does not exist. No procedure can include all participants – a view from everywhere does not exist either. The objective view of science is the view of no-one in particular.”
The scientific discourse is a very specific kind of discourse, exactly because of its tight institutional structure. It is a serious misunderstanding of the actual scientific practice to conceptualise the situation as if a scientist alone judges the evidential merit of a hypothesis and decides to accept it or reject it. The decision is his or her decision, but not a scientific decision. It becomes a scientific one, only when it has passed through the tight institutional context of the scientific enterprise – only then warrant is certified and objective knowledge is established. A single scientist cannot be objective, only the rules of the scientific process and its outcomes are objective. To the question asked by the public: “Why is science special and why should it be protected by an organised polity?”, the answer is: because our fellow citizens who are doing science are guided by the scientific method encapsulated in the informal rules of science, the only rules so far that we can trust to lead us to a true account of reality. The scientific community establishes the intersubjective validity of its products in virtue of following an objective procedure. No procedure can be absolutely objective – a view from nowhere does not exist. No procedure can include all participants – a view from everywhere does not exist either. The objective view of science is the view of no-one in particular.”
What role do you think philosophy can play in helping science move forward in a positive way?
“Philosophy can provide arguments in favour of truth which is evidently extremely important for the epistemic enterprise of science: how truth should be conceptualised and how our theories and models can become true or truth-like. Going beyond truth, and taking into account that science is a social process which yields these outcomes, i.e. theories and models, then a series of other values become not only important, but indeed constitutive of science: if one is not free to engage in scientific activity, for example, there are no outcomes in the first place to be appraised invoking truth and other so called epistemic values, like empirical adequacy, simplicity or fruitfulness. It seems that non-epistemic values such as freedom, honesty and integrity are also constitutive of the collective scientific inquiry.
Philosophy can highlight this value pluralism and clarify that a trade-off between values becomes mandatory. Who should make the trade-offs and at what level? My own philosophical approach stresses that this is a problem that can be and is de facto addressed in the form of a constitutional issue: what are the highest institutional principles in an organised polity that should regulate the functioning of science, so that all the values that we deem important are appropriately reflected and sufficiently traded off?
I work out five general principles that should be adopted, if science is valued positively and should be protected: 1. Guaranteeing freedom of expression, 2. Mutual rational control by critical discussion, 3. Appropriate steering of scientific competition, 4. Open access to the scientific community and 5. Appropriately fitting formal and informal institutions. Philosophy stresses that the range of the autonomy of science will ultimately depend on upholding the informal rules of science comprising its ethos and its methodology, and these rules must also be defended by the scientists themselves: an eternal vigilance on the part of the scientists is required, a vigilance that can ultimately secure that attempts at domination from the executive arm of government, religious authorities or organised economic interests will remain contestable.
Protecting science means protecting the informal institutions of science, the tacit Constitution of Science written in the heart of the scientists.”
Philosophy can highlight this value pluralism and clarify that a trade-off between values becomes mandatory. Who should make the trade-offs and at what level? My own philosophical approach stresses that this is a problem that can be and is de facto addressed in the form of a constitutional issue: what are the highest institutional principles in an organised polity that should regulate the functioning of science, so that all the values that we deem important are appropriately reflected and sufficiently traded off?
I work out five general principles that should be adopted, if science is valued positively and should be protected: 1. Guaranteeing freedom of expression, 2. Mutual rational control by critical discussion, 3. Appropriate steering of scientific competition, 4. Open access to the scientific community and 5. Appropriately fitting formal and informal institutions. Philosophy stresses that the range of the autonomy of science will ultimately depend on upholding the informal rules of science comprising its ethos and its methodology, and these rules must also be defended by the scientists themselves: an eternal vigilance on the part of the scientists is required, a vigilance that can ultimately secure that attempts at domination from the executive arm of government, religious authorities or organised economic interests will remain contestable.
Protecting science means protecting the informal institutions of science, the tacit Constitution of Science written in the heart of the scientists.”
The interview was published 12th May 2025 and conducted by the Academia Europaea Cardiff Knowledge Hub.
For further information please contact AECardiffHub@cardiff.ac.uk.
.For further information please contact AECardiffHub@cardiff.ac.uk
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