!!M. Remzi Sanver - Selected Publications
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Horan, S, M Osborne and MR Sanver, 2019, Positively responsive collective choice rules and majority rule: A generalization of May’s theorem to many alternatives, International Economic Review, 60(4), 1489-1504.\\
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Erdamar, B, MR Sanver and S Sato, 2017, Evaluationwise strategy-proofness, Games and Economic Behavior, 106, 227-238.\\
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Chatterji, S, MR Sanver and A Sen, 2013, On domains that admit well-behaved strategy-proof social choice functions, Journal of Economic Theory, 148 (3), 1050-1073.\\
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Aleskerov, F, D Karabekyan, MR Sanver, V Yakuba, 2012, On the manipulability of voting rules: The case of 4 and 5 alternatives, Mathematical Social Sciences, 64, 67-73.\\
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Zwicker, WS and MR Sanver, 2009, One-way monotonicity as a form of strategy-proofness,  International Journal of Game Theory, 38(4), 553-574.\\
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Özyurt, S and MR Sanver, 2009, A General Impossibility result on strategy-proof social choice hyperfunctions, Games and Economic Behavior, 66, 880-892.\\
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Brams SJ and MR Sanver, 2009, Voting systems that combine approval and preference, in The Mathematics of Preference, Choice and Order (eds. Brams, S., W.V. Gehrlein and F.S. Roberts), Springer, 215-237. \\
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Benoit, JP, E Ok and MR Sanver, 2007, On combining implementable social choice rules, Games and Economic Behavior, 60 (1), 20-30.\\
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Brams, SJ and MR Sanver, 2006, Critical strategies under approval voting: who gets ruled in and who gets ruled out, Electoral Studies, 25 (2), 287-305.  \\
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Aşan, G and MR Sanver, 2002, Another characterization of the majority rule, Economics Letters, 75 (3), 409-413.